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LIABILITY OF SPOUSES
ON JOINT RETURNS
PHILIP J. ERBACHER*
In a recent decision of the United States Tax Court, Henry kl. Rod-
ney and Lucille H. Rodney,' decided November 25, 1969, a majority
of the Tax Court found that:
The fact that a determination for a particular year against a
husband who filed a joint return for tax year with his wife is
not res judicata against the wife for the same year is the under-
lying basis of our holding in Nadine I. Davenport, 48 TC 921
(1967). The inescapable conclusion from these cases and others
of similar import is that a wife who files a joint return with her
husband is not a party privy to her husband in litigation before
this Court.2
The most unusual aspect of this case is that six of the judges dis-
sented from this holding. It is surprising that there could be so much
doubt about the decision, since both precedent and fairness seem to
justify it.
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that the conclusion of
the United States Tax Court is a correct application of the legal princi-
ples underlying the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel in
tax cases.
The problem is illustrated by the following example, which is a
simplified statement of the facts in Rodney. Assume that for the year
1964 a husband and wife file a joint federal income tax return prior
to April 15, 1965. Thereafter, the Internal Revenue Service makes an
examination of the return and discovers a deficiency, determining that
the income from a certain transaction was not properly reported, or
that a loss should be disallowed, or that a deduction taken should not
be granted. For one reason or another, one of the spouses does not de-
sire to contest the deficiency at that time and thus does not respond to
the statutory notice of deficiency (90-day letter). Instead, only one
spouse, for example the husband, contests the matter in the United
States Tax Court, and after a final judgment is entered against him,
the Internal Revenue Service is unable to collect the judgment. In
the interim, the Internal Revenue Service proceeds against the wife,
who did not contest the deficiency, by making an assessment against her.
* A. B. Rockhurst College; J. D. University of Missouri at Kansas City Law
School; Attorney associated with firm of Hoskins, King, Springer, McGannon
and Hahn, Kansas City, Missouri; formerly member of the law faculties of
Marquette University Law School, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and University of
Missouri at Kansas City Law School, Kansas City, Missouri.
1 53 T.C. 287 (1969).
2 Id. at 307.
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She pays the tax in question. Thereafter, the wife files a claim for re-
fund of the tax paid on the ground that the determination of the de-
ficiency was improper. The claim is disallowed, and the wife files suit
in the United States District Court for refund.
In the course of the proceeding in the District Court, the Com-
missioner pleads that the plaintiff is barred either by res judicata or
by collateral estoppel from asserting the right to the refund because
of the prior judgment in the Tax Court against the husband. Should
the plaintiff be barred from contesting the matter because of the Tax
Court's prior decision? In Rodney this question was especially im-
portant because if the wife were to be given a new and separate trial,
the statute of limitations would intervene.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides3 that a husband
and wife may, with certain exceptions, file a joint return even though
one of the spouses does not have gross income or deductions. Under
the Internal Revenue Code, if a joint return is filed, the tax is com-
puted on the aggregate income, and the liability with respect to the
tax "shall be joint and several."4
Under Revenue Ruling 56-92,, it is the position of the Internal
Revenue Service that although a joint return is to be treated as the
return of a single unit for tax computation purposes, nevertheless the
liability of each spouse is joint and several. Applying this logic, the
IRS has stated that:
... in the event of an overpayment of tax as returned and paid by
husband and wife pursuant to their joint and several liability,
both the husband and wife, jointly and severally, represent the
persons who made the overpayment within the meaning of
Section 6402, . . . and therefore the amount thereof may be
credited upon the separate tax liability of either the husband or
wife for a prior year. (emphasis added)
It is believed that the above ruling is correct, because, although
there is a single taxable base (the net taxable income) shown on the
return to which the tax is applied, the husband and the wife are separate
taxpayers. Thus, a determination against one spouse should not bar
the other from having his day in court. The theory is that even though
the husband and wife sign a joint return, they are not in legal privity
and thus, as separate taxpayers, cannot be barred by either the doctrine
of res judicata or that of collateral estoppel from contesting liability,
unless they choose to do so in a joint contest.
3 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6013(a).
4 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6013 (d) (3).
5 1956-1 Cum. BULL. 364.
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Holdings of the Tax Court, the Supreme Court of the United States,
and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Dolan,6 Mitchell,7 Sunnevn v.
Commissioner,8 Moore v. U.S.,9 and other cases establish the basis
for this position.
In Dolan, the Tax Court specifically held that a husband and wife,
filing joint returns, are separate taxpayers. The court stated that:
The case law also supports treating as separate "taxpayers" a
husband and wife who have filed a joint return. In what appears
to be the only case in which the single entity theory was expressly
ruled upon, the court held that husband and wife who filed a
joint return were separate taxpayers, so that an assessment
entered pursuant to a notice of deficiency sent to the husband
was ineffective as to the wife.... This 'Court will accept separate
petitions from the parties to a joint return, even though section
6213(a) and section 272(a) (1) of the 1939 Code provided that
"the taxpayer" may petition for redetermination of a defi-
ciency....
Since John was a separate "taxpayer" within section 6213
(d), it follows that he had an absolute right at any time to waive
the restrictions on assessment and collection contained in Section
6213 (a) .1° (citations omitted)
In Dolan, Judge Dawson in his concurring opinion expanded on the
theory with reference to -the bankruptcy situation in the following lan-
guage:
First even though a husband and wife may file a joint return,
they remain separate and distinct taxpayers .... The essential
characteristic of joint and several liability is that a creditor may,
at his option, sue each party to such liability separately or all
parties together.... (Emphasis added)
... Before a deficiency notice can be sent, the husband alone
is placed in bankruptcy. If it is concluded that the husband is a
separate taxpayer for the purpose of Section 6871(a), the Com-
missioner is permitted to make an immediate assessment against
the husband, and the obvious purpose of the section is fulfilled.
... If, however, it is concluded that the filing of a joint return
creates not two separate -taxpayers, but only one, the Commis-
sioner cannot avail himself of Section 6871, a result which is
attributable to the fact that the taxpayer entity, consisting of
husband and wife, is not itself bankrupt. It is evident that the
adoption of the latter conclusion would not only place an unneces-
sary limiation on Section 6871, but would seriously hinder the
purpose for which the section was enacted ... 31 (citation
omitted).
6 44 T.C. 420 (1965).
751 T.C. 641 (1969).
8333 U.S. 591 (1948).
9 360 F.2d 353 (1965).10 44 T.C. 420 at 428 (1965).
1Id. at 436 (1965).
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The position in Dolan was also adopted in Anne Goyne Mitchell,12
which held that a prior assessment of income tax against a wife and
husband in a community property state was invalid and void as to
the wife, who had not consented to the assessment. The court reasoned:
The fact that the assessment may have been valid against Emmett
is of no consequence in the instant case, when Anne neither
consented to the execution of form 870 nor authorized Emmett
to act on her behalf.'
3
It thus seems reasonably clear from the preceding discussion that
the husband and wife are different taxpayers, even though their
liability is joint and several for each year in which a joint return is
filed. Having established that there are two individual taxpayers, it is
necessary to examine the application of the doctrine of collateral estop-
pel to joint obligations of this type:
The rule provides that where a court of competent juris-
diction has entered a final judgment on the merits of a cause of
action, the parties to the suit and their privies are -thereafter
bound "not only as to every matter which was offered and re-
ceived to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any
other admissable matter which might have been offered for the
purpose" .... 14
These same concepts are applicable in the federal income tax
field. Collateral estoppel operates, in other words, to relieve
the Government and the taxpayer of redundant litigation of
,the identical question of the statute's application to the taxpayer's
status .... 15 (Emphasis added).
In the above statement of the law the italicized words indicate the
parties to whom the doctrine can be applied. These apparently include
only the parties to the suit-the taxpayers-and their privies. It is
submitted that under the doctrine of Dolan and the previously described
Revenue Ruling 56-92, not only are the husband and wife different tax-
payers, but the condition of being husband and wife and of having
signed a joint return for a particular year does not put them in privity
with each other.
By way of analogy, the general rule pertaining to collection of judg-
ments against one spouse from the property of the other treats husbands
and wives as individuals. It has been stated -that the "interest of the
husband in the realty of his wife cannot be affected by a decree against
his wife when she has not been joined in the suit"' 6 and that "the wife
must be made a party if relief is being sought out of her separate
estate."'
7
"251 T.C. 641 (1969).
13 Id. at 650.
14 333 U.S. 591 at 597 (1948).
15 Id. at 598.
1641 A i. JUR. 2d Husbazd and Wife, § 541 (1968) ; see: Watts v. Waddle,
10 U.S. 164 (1832).
17 Id.; See also Feitner v. Lewis, 119 N.Y. 131, 23 N.E. 296 (1890).
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Reference is made to the discussion of this problem in American
Jurisprudence,"' which notes that the minimum identification with the
controversy where -the judgment is rendered must be that of privity.
Under this rule, a judgment is conclusive of the issues involved in a
controversy as between the parties and the persons in privity with them.
Privity is described as denoting "mutual or successive relationship to
the same right of property."' 9 As to joint and several obligors, it states
that:
There i's authority that in the absence of a satisfaction, a judg-
ment rendered against one or more persons severally liable
is not a bar to an action against the remaining obligors, who are
not considered as in privity with the judgment debtors.' '20
(emphasis added).
It is further noted that, in the absence of a satisfaction, a judgment
against one of several joint obligors will not bar an action against the
others.21 This rule can be applied in a variety of situations:
Thus a judgment in an action by one spouse for personal injuries
is not res judicata and constitutes no estoppel with respect to a
suit by the other for personal injuries, where the injuries of
each occurred in the same accident and were the result of the
same wrongful act or negligence of the defendant. ..22
As between husband and wife, it is stated that there is no legal privity
such as to cause a judgment for one spouse to preclude the other, where
the action involves their separate property, rights or interests.23
Applying the preceding general rules, and bearing in mind the decision
in Dolan, the following cases are noted in the tax field. Moore v. U.S.
2 4
specifically holds that where a husband and wife file a joint return and
thereafter the husband alone is a party to a criminal proceeding in which
he is convicted of willfully attempting to evade and defeat payment of
income tax for the year involved, the wife is not collaterally estopped
thereby from litigating the question of the husband's fraud in a subse-
quent civil suit involving the application of a fraud penalty. The court
stated:
Due process requires that she be accorded her day in court on the
issue of her husband's fraud ... nor should his conviction preju-
dice her position in the civil proceeding. (emphasis added) 25
1s 46 Ami. JUR. 2d Judgments, § 531-534 (1968).
19Id., § 532.
201d., § 542; see: Stacy v. Thrasher, 16 U.S. 596 (1847).
I Id., § 545.
2241 AM JUR. 2d., Husband and wife, § 459; Lindsay v. Oregon Short Line P.
Co., 13 Idaho 477.
2350 C.J.S. Judgments, § 798 (1947).
24360 F.2d 353 cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1965).
25 Id. at 358.
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Similar results have been reached in other cases. In Seligman v.
Comm'r,20 it was held that where a divorced wife-contested the inclusion
of certain amounts of income as alimony payments paid by a former
husband under a divorce decree, a prior judgment of the Tax Court
holding that the husband was entitled to deduct the payments in question
as alimony was not res judicata as to the treatment of the same pay-
ments as income to the ex-wife, since she was not a party to the pro-
ceeding in the Tax Court involving the husband.
In U.S. v. Wilson,2 7 where the Tax Court had determined in a
proceeding involving a son and member of a claimed family partner-
ship that .the father, Asbury Wilson, was a valid member of a family
partnership and therefore had reduced the deficiency proposed against
the son, the holding in the proceeding against the son was not res judi-
cata on the issue of whether the father was a member of the partnership
in a separate proceeding against the father in the District Court.
The Seligman case was followed by -the Tax Court in Estate of
Haldeman,28 in which the court stated:
Nor is our prior holding binding on decedent under the doc-
trine of res judicata since she was not a party to the prior pro-
ceeding involving her husband. (Emphasis added) 29
In Dorothy Douglas,30 where the parties filed a joint return as hus-
band and wife, the government sought to rely on a stipulation in the
husband's case to the effect that the husband was liable for a fraud
penalty for the year 1947, as proof that the wife was liable for the
penalty in her case before the Tax Court for the same year. The Tax
Court rejected this as proof of the wife's liability for the fraud penal-
ties for the year 1947, even though a joint return was filed.
Thus, it is clear that the tax cases follow, as they must, the principles
set out above in Sunnen v. Commissioner.
Judge Tannenwald of the Tax Court, in his concurring opinion in
the Rodney case, expounds the same theory relating to joint and several
obligations when he notes that
[t]he obligee of a joint and several obigation may proceed sepa-
rately against each obligator. A judgment against one obligator
is not a basis for collateral estoppel against another; each joint
and several obligator is entitled to be heard on the merits of the
claim asserted against him. (Emphasis added; citations omitted) 31
The correct position appears to be, as noted by the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit in Moore v. U.S.a2 that:
26207 F.2d 489 (1953).
27 117 F. Supp. 957 (1953).
2815 T.C.M. 900.
Id.
3027 T.C. 306 (1956).
3153. T.C. 287 at 322 (1969).
32360 F2d 353 (1965).
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Due process requires that she be accorded her day in court on the
issue of her husband's fraud ... nor should his conviction pre-judice her position in the civil proceeding.33
The doctrine should not be limited to fraud penalties. 34 The fact that
one spouse has had his day in court on -the issue of tax liability should
not preclude the other spouse from a separate hearing. Anything other
than a separate trial would deny the spouse who has not contested the
case the requisites of due process.
There are those who argue that this conclusion should not be reached,
on the ground -that, since the issue of liability is essentially identical in
the case of the husband and wife and there is only a single proceeding
involved, economy and convenience require application of res judicata
to end litigation.
One authority contends that the doctrine of privity should be
extended to persons whose interests are protected, regardless of the
relationship between them and the party in the prior action. 35
While economy may be a desirable end, it is submitted that with the
present state of the law where the liability of the husband and wife on a
joint return is joint and several, the issue should not be treated differ-
ently in this type tax case than in any other case involving joint and
several liability. The Supreme Court of the United States long ago
noted in Stacy v. Thrasher, relating to joint and several obligors:
"Their common liability to pay the same debt creates no privity between
them either in law or in estate." 36
33 d. at 358.
34See: 48 T.C. 921 (1967) ; 117 F. Supp. 957 (1953) ; 207 F.2d 489 (1953) ; 360
F.2d 353 (1965) ; 44 T.C. 420 (1965) ; 51 T.C. 641 (1968).
35 50 IowA L. REv. 26, 45 (1945).36 Stacy v. Thrasher, 16 U.S. 596 (1847).
